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THE MEDICAL NONNECESSITY OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 
CAROLYN MCLEOD 
 
Abstract  
Debate has raged in Canada recently over whether in vitro fertilization (IVF) should be funded 
through public health insurance. Such a move would require that the provinces classify IVF as a 
medically necessary service. In this paper, I defend the position I have taken publicly—
especially in Ontario, my own province—that IVF is not medically necessary. I contend that, by 
funding IVF on grounds of medical necessity, governments like Ontario’s violate their 
commitments to equality and fairness, and cause harm. They do the last by suggesting that the 
lives of people who forgo procreation, and perhaps have children in other ways (e.g., through 
adoption), will be stunted.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Whether in vitro fertilization (IVF) is medically necessary (or essential) determines, in 
many jurisdictions, whether it ought to be funded through public health insurance. This is 
certainly the case in Canada, where the Canada Health Act (1985) requires that provinces pay for 
all medically necessary health care services (Kaposy 2009). Debate raged recently in Ontario, 
my own province, over whether IVF should be deemed medically necessary and therefore 
covered under Ontario’s Health Insurance Plan (OHIP). Advocates for public funding insisted 
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that Ontario, along with most other provinces in Canada, were behind the times in not having 
such funding, given how many governments around the world, including most European ones, 
cover the costs of multiple cycles of IVF (see, e.g., Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society 
2014). 
By contrast, others, including me, argued that IVF should not be funded under OHIP (see, 
e.g., McLeod and Botterell 2014).1 In this paper, I explain in detail why I took this stand. To be 
clear about my position, it is not that IVF is always medically inappropriate. It is appropriate for 
people who strongly desire to have biological children but who cannot have them without 
medical assistance. However, it is not reasonable for a government like Ontario’s to support the 
preference that many people have for biological children by funding IVF on grounds of medical 
necessity. (Whether such a government should fund IVF on other grounds, assuming that’s 
possible, is not an issue on which I take a position in this paper. See section 3.c. below. I also do 
not take a stand on whether the government should fund forms of fertility treatment other than 
IVF on grounds of medical necessity. See section 3.b. below.)2 As is evident in what follows, my 
argument is relevant to governments that are similar to Ontario’s in being liberal democratic and 
in governing over communities in which people generally have some freedom not to desire to 
have biological children; they would not be subject to abuse, serious social ostracism, or the like 
if they rejected this desire—as they would unfortunately be if they lived in other parts of the 
world (McLeod and Ponesse 2008). For simplicity, I refer simply to “the government,” by which 
I mean a government of this sort.  
Why do I say that IVF should not be classified as a medically necessary service by the 
government? My reasons, in brief, are the following. Decisions about which treatments are 
medically necessary cannot be separated from decisions about how important it is that people 
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have the capacity that the treatment seeks to restore or give to patients. In the case of IVF, this 
capacity normally is procreation.3 IVF is expensive, carries risks, and is stressful. In my view, 
the government should not consider procreation to be so important that it is willing to fund IVF 
on grounds of medical necessity. Doing so would involve assuming that becoming a parent 
through procreation is superior to becoming a parent in other ways (e.g., through adoption) or to 
choosing a life without children. The government cannot endorse such a view without violating 
its commitments to equality and fairness, and without harming people, including children waiting 
to be adopted.  
This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I clarify why I believe the following are 
interlocking questions: (1) Is IVF medically necessary? (2) To what extent do we value people’s 
ability to conceive and bear children? Here and elsewhere, I rely on a common sense definition 
of a medically necessary service: that such a “service is one that a patient needs in order to avoid 
a negative health consequence” (Charles et al. 1997, 365).4 In claiming that we cannot identify 
needs of this sort, or establish their importance, without deciding how much we value certain 
physiological or psychological capacities, I appeal to literature in the philosophy of medicine on 
health and disease.  
In the second part, I explain why, in deeming IVF medically necessary, the government 
would be valuing procreation at a high level, and why this level is simply too high because it 
does not allow the government to appreciate other ways of becoming a parent, such as adopting a 
child, or the potential value of forgoing parenthood altogether. Of particular relevance here is the 
effort and expense that goes into making IVF work. One has to be very committed to bearing 
children to be willing to proceed with IVF. In discussing this specific point and the more general 
point about how much the government should value procreation (compared, e.g., with adoption), 
 4 
I draw on literature in philosophy, bioethics, and sociology on IVF, procreation, and adoption. I 
also appeal to my personal experience with infertility, being an IVF patient and an adoptive 
mother. My partner and I did two cycles of intrauterine insemination and one cycle of IVF before 
turning to adoption to become parents. At around the same time, I was witness to my sister’s 
struggle with infertility, and to the joy she felt in giving birth to two children. This personal 
perspective complements the research I do on infertility and adoption. Both give me insight into 
what it is like to be infertile, to undergo IVF, and to adopt a child.  
 
2. Interlocking questions 
Let me begin with a discussion not about IVF but about how to understand medical 
necessity. I have already said that we cannot determine what is medically necessary without 
reflecting on which capacities we value. I have also appealed to the common sense idea that 
medical necessity is connected with health needs. What our values are shape what these needs 
are, according to many theories of health in the philosophy of medicine (Ereshefsky 2009). 
Nonetheless, there are prominent theories of health—naturalist theories—according to which 
this claim about values is false. In addition, one could use such a theory to describe what is 
medically necessary without making reference to what we value. In this section, I show that such 
an argument will not work. In particular, it fails to establish that questions about medical 
necessity and about what we value are separate. I conclude that these questions are indeed 
interlocking. Whether IVF is medically necessary therefore depends on how much value the 
government places, or is willing to place, on procreation. 
 Before turning to the view that I reject, let me clarify briefly my own view about medical 
necessity. To reiterate, I believe that we would not identify a certain service as medically 
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necessary unless we valued the capacity that the service would restore, if only temporarily. We 
would also have to value it to the degree that the service demands, given, for example, how 
invasive or expensive the service is. Only then would we say that the relevant service satisfies a 
health need, and only if we valued the relevant capacity would we say that it is important to our 
health. With this last point, I am relying on a view about health according to which values play 
an important role in determining who or what is healthy (and who or what is diseased) 
(Ereshefsky 2009, 222).5 My reasons for interpreting the term “health” in this way should be 
clear from my discussion below about theories of health—naturalist theories—that describe it as 
value neutral.   
People who are naturalists about health might claim that judgments about medical 
necessity are not value judgments. The most influential proponent of naturalism is Christopher 
Boorse (1975; Ereshefsky 2009, 222-23). For Boorse, health is the absence of disease, and 
disease is an impairment of species-typical normal functioning.6 Moreover, human beings have a 
natural design and are healthy or diseased depending on whether we function in a way that 
conforms to this design (57). The design includes functions that contribute to the goals we have 
as biological organisms: to survive and reproduce. The natural functions of components of us are 
their “species-typical contributions” to our biological fitness (57). To be clear, “natural” and 
“normal,” in this theory, do not mean desirable (57). Certain states are healthy or diseased 
independently of whether people desire them. A human being is diseased when she or he exhibits 
some biological dysfunction, regardless of whether people value the relevant form of 
functioning.  
One could certainly draw on Boorse’s theory to try to show that IVF and other fertility 
treatments are medically necessary, and do so without discussing how desirable procreation is for 
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us. The argument would proceed as follows. Infertility is a form of procreative dysfunction.7 
Infertility is therefore a disease, at least for people in certain age groups (see note 6). To avoid or 
remedy this disease, some patients require fertility treatments such as IVF. Consequently, these 
treatments are medically necessary. Here, “medical necessity” refers simply to what people need 
to attain species-typical normal functioning, and biology alone determines such need, rather than 
biology and values.8 No value judgment is required.   
Such an approach, however, is seriously problematic. Some of its problems interestingly 
have nothing to do with how it interprets “health” and “disease.” Let me discuss two such 
concerns. First, since the argument deems medically necessary fertility services used only by 
people who have an underlying disease (i.e., mainly heterosexual couples) rather than people 
who simply have a desire to have children that they cannot satisfy without assistance from others 
(i.e., mainly single people and homosexual couples), it would appear to condone a system of 
unequal access to these services, one in which only heterosexual couples can get publicly funded 
treatment.9 Second, the argument implies that all treatments for disease are medically necessary. 
However, there are treatments and there are treatments, and not all of them are medically 
necessary.10 Some are better than others (e.g., purely on grounds of cost), and, for some, there 
are nonmedical alternatives. To illustrate the latter point: improving the social environments of 
people who have physical disabilities by making these environments more accessible to them can 
be a nonmedical alternative to correcting, or trying to correct, their medical problems. It can be a 
better alternative moreover depending on the nature of the medical fix (e.g., how invasive it is) 
and of the nonmedical fix (e.g., how feasible it is). Similarly, adoption is a nonmedical 
alternative to fertility treatment, and can be an equal, if not a better, alternative depending on the 
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nature of the recommended medical treatment for infertility, as well as how functional and 
ethical available systems of adoption are.  
The above approach to understanding medical necessity is also problematic, however, 
because of how it interprets “health” and “disease.” There are concerns about whether Boorse’s 
theory can explain disagreements we have over what counts as a disease11 and also whether it is 
value-free in its use of the terms “natural” and “normal” (Ereshefsky 2009, 222-23; Daniels 
1985, 30). But let me focus on a different problem, one that assumes that our understanding of 
medical necessity should conform to medical practice and questions whether Boorse’s theory 
satisfies this criterion. There are two issues here. The first is that “medical practice 
unquestionably presupposes the value of health,” as Boorse himself admits (60),12 whereas his  
theory describes health as value neutral. In medical practice, that is, biological functions that 
count in assessments of health and disease are those, and only those, that are deemed important 
or desirable. (Abnormal functioning that is considered unimportant does not count as a health 
failure.) The second issue is that, unlike the theory, medical practice does not treat human beings 
merely as biological organisms. Patients are understood as having multiple goals, including goals 
that can conflict with biological fitness (Ereshefsky 2009, 223). For example, a patient can 
reasonably request to be sterile because of career goals she has. Thus, again assuming that our 
understanding of medical necessity should conform to medical practice, it cannot be defined in 
terms of Boorse’s theory of health, and more generally, cannot treat health as though it were 
value neutral.  
To conclude this section: any attempt through philosophical argument to divorce 
questions about medical necessity from those about what we value is bound to fail. Such an 
argument would have to appeal to a conception of health that cannot explain the importance we 
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associate with certain health needs when we say that satisfying them is medically necessary. In 
so doing, we do not conceive of health as value neutral. Rather, we make a judgment about what 
value health has, or what value specific capacities have that may contribute to our health. By 
extension, in deciding whether a particular intervention is medically necessary, we must agree on 
the value of the capacity that the intervention might restore, if only temporarily. Assuming that is 
correct, let us turn now to procreation. 
 
3. Valuing procreation 
Compared to many other capacities that medical treatment might restore or provide, the 
value that procreation has for us is obscure. While few people would question the importance of 
being able to breathe easily, for example, many would dispute the value of procreation. For some 
people, the ability to procreate (i.e., their fertility) is an impediment to them leading a good life, 
which for them is a life without children. At the opposite extreme are the many people for whom 
infertility is a serious barrier to happiness (McMillan 2001, 12). And, in the middle, are those 
who find infertility disappointing, but not at all tragic (Uniacke 1987, 244).13  
It is common to assume that everyone experiences infertility in the same way as the 
second group above: that is, as a serious barrier to happiness. Yet, most of the studies used to 
support such a claim focus on people who seek or have sought treatment for infertility (e.g., 
Freeman et al. 1985; Domar et al. 1993; Chen et al. 2004). And there is a problem with 
generalizing from this group to everyone who is infertile. In his widely cited paper about 
infertility and psychological distress, Arthur Greil (1997) notes that, by focusing on “clinic 
samples” (as most of the literature does in this area), one lets “a select group of the infertile, who 
are almost certainly not representative of the infertile population as a whole, speak for the whole 
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group” (1699). Thus, according to Greil, we cannot conclude, because some or many patients of 
fertility clinics experience extreme anxiety about their infertility, that infertility generally is a 
source of immense unhappiness for people.    
Given that people’s opinions clearly do differ about the value of procreation, it is not 
obvious what value procreation has for us. My question is whether the government should 
ascribe such a high value to procreation that it categorizes IVF as a medically necessary service. 
I believe that the answer is no. Let me proceed by explaining first the nature of IVF, second how 
much one would have to value procreation in order to deem IVF medically necessary, and third 
why the government valuing it this much would, in my opinion, be inappropriate and wrong.  
a. In vitro fertilization  
An important background issue for this paper concerns the nature of IVF. In describing 
IVF, I will draw heavily, though not exclusively, from a report produced by the Ontario Ministry 
of Children and Youth Services’ Expert Panel on Infertility and Adoption (2009; hereafter, “the 
Expert Panel” and “the Report”), a panel which, to be clear, advocated in favor of public funding 
for IVF. For the bare facts about the process of IVF, see the Report (98-99). This fertility 
intervention enables some people to bear a child; however, it is also often unsuccessful, it is 
expensive, it carries risks (in addition to those associated with an increased chance of having a 
multiple birth), and it is stressful. I defer to the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society (2014) 
on the matter of success rates (i.e., in Canada),14 and to the Report on matters of cost and risk 
(see 109-10 on cost, and 101-12 on risks).  
Let me discuss briefly why IVF is stressful psychologically. The sources of stress for IVF 
patients are potentially very numerous. Cost is one source, and admittedly a big one, for many 
people; but there are other sources as well. For example, IVF is time consuming, particularly for 
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women, because of the frequent blood tests and ultrasounds (Report 2009, 98). The time 
commitment involved with even one cycle of IVF is substantial and can pose serious difficulties 
for women who have paying jobs. Many women experience significant physical discomfort from 
the treatments (Suthersan et al. 2011), which can be stressful. There are also the “ups and 
downs” of treatment, which are mentioned in the Report (121). The treatment can go well one 
day, badly the next, and even worse the next—or actually better (!).15 Finally, there is the stigma 
associated with being infertile, which can be heightened while undergoing IVF. The Report often 
refers to the stigma of infertility, but says little about its nature. It suggests that this problem 
exists because people assume that infertility is somehow voluntary (134), which would mean that 
people who are infertile are responsible for it. Indeed, many women, in particular, blame 
themselves for infertility, even when it is unexplained (McLeod and Ponesse 2008). They do so, 
in part, because others tell them that if they just relaxed, they would get pregnant. The Report 
neglects to mention how much stronger these social messages can become during IVF treatment. 
Everything is timed so perfectly. How could it not work? If it fails, it must be the patient’s fault. 
There are studies showing that IVF is stressful enough that many patients stop the 
treatment even when they have been relieved of the burden of financing it. One such report states 
that the “most common reason that patients drop out of IVF treatment, even when it is covered 
by medical insurance, is psychological distress” (Cousineau and Domar 2007, 304). The authors 
claim, more precisely, that, in a number of surveys done in countries where people are insured 
for IVF treatment, “the psychological burden of the procedures appeared to be the major reason 
for drop-out” (300). Among these studies is a “large Swedish [one] of 974 couples,” which 
“reported that two thirds (65%) did not complete the three IVF cycles which were covered under 
their health plan”; and a “retrospective study of over 2000 German patients,” which “found that, 
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despite the fact that these patients were covered by insurance for four cycles, the drop-out rate of 
non-pregnant patients was 40% after the first cycle …” (300). In short, IVF can be very 
burdensome psychologically even when patients do not pay for it themselves.  
The nature of IVF explains why one would have to place substantial value on procreation 
in order to accept the medical necessity of it. But so does the presence of alternatives to IVF. Let 
me turn to these topics now.   
b. Valuing procreation: how much?   
In saying that IVF is medically necessary, one implies that the inability to procreate is a 
serious health condition comparable to other conditions that most patients would go to great 
lengths medically to try to fix. The opportunity to attempt to bypass the condition through IVF is 
worth the months of medical appointments, injections, difficult scheduling, emotional ups and 
downs, and so on. Procreation must be worth this much if IVF is indeed medically necessary. 
But procreation also has to be more valuable than the alternatives to IVF, including adoption, 
which satisfies what is surely the most important goal of procreation: having children.16 That is, 
for IVF to be medically necessary, procreation has to be superior to adoption as a way of forming 
a family with children, and also superior to having no children. Procreation has to be so valuable 
that it is worth not only undergoing the effort and incurring the risks involved in IVF, but also 
forgoing the alternatives.16 Some individuals indeed may value procreation this much; however, 
the issue here is whether the government should do so.  
Some might object that in deeming IVF medically necessary, the government would not 
be valuing procreation over adoption, but rather would simply be valuing parenting. The reason 
is that for many people who cannot have children on their own, becoming a parent is best 
achieved through IVF. Adoption is not, in fact, a good alternative to IVF, specifically because of 
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how difficult it tends to be to adopt a child. Thus, without access to IVF, these people really have 
no good options for becoming parents. One problem with this objection is that it is questionable 
whether it is generally harder to adopt a child than to undergo IVF.18 A further problem is that 
adoption need not be as difficult as it currently is in many places. For example, the Expert Panel 
(2009) recommended in the Report various changes that would make adoption—particularly, 
public domestic adoption—a better, easier option for many people in Ontario. Hence, comparing 
IVF with the status quo on adoption is inappropriate, at least in Ontario where the status quo on 
adoption is in need of serious repair (Cohn 2015b).19 Moreover, making such a comparison while 
simultaneously arguing that the status quo on IVF needs to change (i.e., so that IVF becomes 
publicly funded) is simply unreasonable. Since the objection we are now considering commits 
such an error, it cannot refute my claim that to endorse the medical necessity of IVF is to 
promote procreation over adoption.  
As an aside, consider that the process of adoption may always be more difficult than 
pursuing fertility treatments that are less invasive or intensive than IVF (e.g., surgery to fix a 
malformed uterus or laparoscopy to treat endometriosis), and thus perhaps the government 
should fund them at least on grounds of medical necessity. To do so, it would not need to value 
procreation as much as it would to fund IVF (assuming also that these treatments are less 
expensive). Without committing myself to any particular position on this matter, let me say that, 
given how I have understood medical necessity—in particular the connection I’ve drawn 
between medical necessity and what we value—the government could consistently classify as 
medically necessary these less invasive and expensive fertility treatments without doing the same 
for IVF. Doing so would suggest that it values procreation only to the degree implied in funding 
these particular treatments.  
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c. Valuing procreation: too much 
 Thus far, I have claimed that, in order to classify IVF as a medically necessary service, 
procreation must be highly valued, and valued more than other ways of forming a family with 
children and also more than having a life without children. Let us now discuss whether the 
government should value procreation to this extent. There are serious problems with it doing so, 
in my opinion, including problems having to do with equality, fairness, and harm.  
1. Equality  
The issue of equality is controversial. Some argue that the status quo on IVF in North 
America, according to which IVF is not publicly funded, actually exacerbates inequality by 
allowing only the rich to access this service (e.g., Nisker 2008). Thus, we should eliminate the 
status quo. By contrast, according to others, equality demands that we maintain the status quo.20 I 
accept the latter position for the following reasons.  
The view that public funding for IVF would promote equality presumes exactly what I 
think needs to be questioned in the debate about such funding: that procreation has a high level 
of importance. Notice that without such a presumption, advocates of the view must accept that 
the state should remedy inequalities in areas that have relatively little importance. A stark 
example is an inequality in the ability to sail. The mere fact that only some people can go sailing 
does not justify public funding for sailing programs. Why not? Because sailing, or having the 
ability to sail, is simply not important. Surely, people who argue on grounds of equality that the 
government should fund IVF would agree with this claim. But then it follows that they must 
accept that, unlike sailing, procreation is important, indeed important enough to fund IVF 
(despite the nature of IVF and the availability of such alternatives to it as adoption).  
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The question then becomes whether the above presumption about procreation is justified. 
Our earlier discussion about different people’s reactions to their fertility or infertility suggests 
that many people would reject this presumption. Many philosophers, including me, would also 
reject it. Some of these philosophers accept that parenting is very important for many people 
(although not for everyone); however, according to them, the goods of parenting do not require 
procreation (e.g., Brighouse and Swift 2006; Brighouse and Swift 2014; De Wispelaere and 
Weinstock 2014; Overall 2014). One can have these goods through adoption, for example. 
Others assume that even parenting, or being able to become a parent, is not essential to living 
well (i.e., for anyone), and that it would be better for the planet and people currently living on it 
if we were to procreate less (e.g., MacIver 2015; Benatar 2015). I’m inclined to accept the first 
position, but am also persuaded of some aspects of the second.  
According to both of the above positions in the philosophical literature on parenting, 
having biological children, or having the capacity to do so, is a mere preference rather than a 
basic need or an objective interest (i.e., an interest that one must satisfy in order to live a good 
life). Using this understanding of procreation, we can see why equality would demand that the 
government not subsidize people’s attempts to procreate through IVF, since a kind of inequality 
occurs when the government supports the fulfillment of some preferences (e.g., to have 
biological children) but not others (e.g., to travel the world). Some people get special treatment 
that they do not deserve, because what is at stake for them again is the satisfaction of a mere 
preference. And though we should perhaps tolerate such undeserved treatment when it results in 
minor inequalities—for example, the inequality that might occur when space in a public park is 
devoted to skateboarders rather than to tennis players—we should not tolerate it when it results 
in major inequalities. Yet, inequalities of the latter sort would almost certainly occur if IVF were 
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publicly funded, because some people would be spared having to pay thousands of dollars to 
fulfill a preference they have for biological children. It follows, on grounds of equality, that IVF 
should not be designated a medically necessary service so that it receives public funding. 
Some might object to the claim that public funding for IVF would result in major 
inequalities by asserting that, so long as the funding goes only to IVF with single embryo 
transfer, it would result in a net cost savings to the government (i.e., on the grounds that it would 
diminish the costs associated with treatment induced multiple births; Report 111-14). Thus, it 
isn’t as though ultimately the government would be spending a lot of money to satisfy some 
people’s preference for IVF. To respond, even if that were true, however, the funding would still 
create substantial inequality. Those of us who think that parenthood is an important good should 
be concerned especially with the inequality that such a system would create between people who 
choose IVF and those who choose private (domestic or intercountry) adoption. Both services—
IVF and private adoption—cost individuals thousands of dollars (which isn’t usually the case 
with public domestic adoption, in Canada at least; see below). But if IVF were publicly funded, 
it would cost individuals nothing—or relatively little, depending on how much it is funded—
while people who prefer private adoption would still pay out of pocket. Such inequality is 
intolerable, in my opinion.  
  In short, equality demands that the government support, not the preference that many 
people have for a particular kind of parenting (i.e., biological parenting), but either all kinds of 
parenting or none of them. Public funding for IVF would do the former alone, and so would not 
promote equality. In fact, it would do the very opposite.  
2. Fairness  
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The above discussion about equality suggests that it would be unfair of the government to 
subsidize a particular way of becoming a parent to the exclusion of others and also perhaps of the 
worthy projects of people who prefer not to have children.21 However, some might complain that 
the government already engages in such unfair behavior when it funds public (domestic) 
adoptions. The Ontario government, for example, offers to pay all of the expenses associated 
with a public adoption (although some people pay themselves for private home studies and 
privately run, government mandated parenting classes when public versions of these services 
have long waiting lists). Indeed, if the government were to recognize IVF as a medically 
necessary service, would it not simply level the playing field between assisted reproduction and 
adoption—at least of the public domestic variety—rather than give the advantage to 
reproduction? This comparison between assisted reproduction and public domestic adoption is 
not a good one, however, because it ignores the prior obligation of the government to children 
who are wards of the state. The government has a special obligation toward these children—
normally, an obligation to find them “forever families”—that it would abandon if it failed to 
support public adoption. Moreover, because of this obligation, it can legitimately favor this form 
of family-making over other forms or over a commitment to being child-free. 
A better comparison would be between assisted reproduction and private adoption. In 
neither case does the above sort of obligation exist for the government. Hence, if our concern is 
with fairness, we should consider whether funding IVF would be fair given the support the 
government currently gives to these adoptions.  
Some jurisdictions provide tax credits to people who adopt children (privately or 
otherwise).22 Canada and Ontario are among them. Currently, people in Ontario who succeed 
with an adoption are eligible for a small provincial tax credit and a larger federal tax credit. In 
 17 
2016, the provincial credit was 5.05 percent of up to $12,033 CAD in eligible expenses for a 
completed adoption, which amounts to at most $608 (Canada Revenue Agency 2016a). The 
federal credit, in the same year, was 15 percent of up to $15,255 CAD in eligible expenses, 
which is, at most, $2,288 CAD (Canada Revenue Agency 2016b). These numbers show that 
people get very little financial support for private adoptions from the Ontario government, 
although they qualify for more substantial support from the federal government. Still, the 
maximum subsidy available to them, in 2016, was only $2,896 CAD, which is a fraction of what 
most private adoptions cost. (It would not even cover the cost of a private home study and 
privately run, government mandated parenting classes.) Moreover, those who pay in full for a 
private adoption but never succeed in adopting a child privately do not qualify for any subsidy. I 
personally know a number of people who fall into this category.  
Now, compare the current subsidies for private adoptions with subsidies proposed for 
IVF in Ontario. The Report (2009) recommended that the Ontario government fund up to three 
cycles of IVF, along with various other services (118).23 The government later announced that it 
would fund one cycle, with single embryo transfer, starting in 2015 (and it made good on this 
promise in December of that year; Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care 2014; 2015). 
Even funding only one cycle, however, would save people who do IVF much more than $2,896 
CAD, and decidedly more than $608 CAD, given that people pay roughly $6,000 CAD for one 
cycle now (Report 2009, 110). Also, the funding would go to everyone who attempts one cycle, 
regardless of whether they get pregnant in the end (of course), whereas adoption subsidies are 
again available only to people who succeed in adopting a child.   
To return to the question we started with: would funding IVF be fair given the support the 
government now provides for private adoptions? The answer with respect to Ontario is clearly 
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no—and it will depend for other jurisdictions, of course, on whether or to what extent the 
government helps to defray the cost of private adoptions. Publicly funding just one cycle of IVF 
in Ontario would make the playing field distinctly unlevel for people in Ontario who do private 
adoptions compared to people who pursue IVF. It would also arguably be unfair to people whose 
personal goals do not include becoming a parent and who do not receive government support for 
pursuing these goals, especially those comparable in worth to parenthood. Such concerns about 
fairness provide a second reason against classifying IVF as a medically necessary service and 
publicly funding it on these grounds. Granted, this reason exists only so long as the government 
refuses to provide comparable subsidies for private adoptions and for similarly worthy pursuits.24  
3. Harm  
A third reason has to do with harm: valuing procreation as much as the government 
would have to do to insist that IVF is medically necessary would create what philosophers call 
expressive harm.25 In particular, the claim that IVF is necessary would express to people who do 
not try, or who stop trying, to remedy infertility through IVF that they have resigned themselves 
to a stunted life: one of poor health and limited contentment. Included among these people are 
those who adopt or foster children, and also those who choose not to become parents. The 
implications for adoptive families in Ontario are particularly significant given our government’s 
mandate for the Expert Panel (2009) to work to make Ontario a “family-friendly province” by 
improving both its fertility and adoptive services (2). Ontario would, in my opinion, not be 
friendly to adoptive families if it determined that IVF was medically necessary. It would signal 
that adoption is an inferior way of forming a family with children, which would be hurtful to 
many people, including some adoptive parents who love their children and find adoption very 
fulfilling, to children who are adopted and love their parents, and also to children who are 
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waiting or hoping to be adopted. The message to the children would be that they could never fill 
the psychological hole that is left behind by an unfulfilled desire to be a biological parent. Their 
families, if they ever get families, will always be second best to biological families.26  
The outcome just described is made more likely by the fact that Canadian society, like 
many other societies, does not always treat adoptive families equally to biological ones. Such 
background conditions will negatively influence the social meaning that the claim that IVF is 
medically necessary will have. There are norms lingering in our society that philosophers call 
bionormative, which suggest that families ought to be biological because real or natural families 
are this way (Haslanger 2009; Witt 2014; Baylis and McLeod 2014). As a result, people 
sometimes ask adopted children whether they know their “real” parents or whether their sibling 
is their “real” sibling. People also sometimes refer to families or to what families are like (i.e., 
“real” ones) without including adoptive families. (The part of the Report [2009] on assisted 
reproduction does this when it refers to people needing assisted reproduction to build their 
families [e.g., 109, 114], by which it must mean biological families.) Because many societies are 
at least somewhat bionormative, they stigmatize adopted children and their parents (Haslanger 
2009). This stigma would contribute to the negative implications of the government insisting that 
IVF is medically necessary.27 
 One might object to the point about expressive harm by stating that negative messages for 
adoptive families are justified if the alternative of refusing to fund IVF on grounds of medical 
necessity is that many people cannot lead good lives. These are people who strongly desire to 
have biological children and who are candidates for IVF but who cannot afford to pay for it 
themselves. Surely, we can expect some people to have to deal with some negativity towards 
their families for the sake of others whose lives would be seriously marred if they did not have 
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biological children. In response, let me say three things: (1) it is doubtful that we should expect 
this much of some people, given the damage that these social messages can cause, particularly 
among children (Haslanger 2009, Leon 2002); (2) we should not have to expect this of anyone in 
an egalitarian society (i.e., that they tolerate negative messages from the government about their 
families even though their family members’ needs are met); and lastly (3) we should not always 
accept the claims people make that biological reproduction is essential to them leading good 
lives. To expand briefly on this last point: people’s reasons can be discriminatory—for example, 
sexist (women are not real women unless they bear children)—or simply based on 
misinformation. For instance, it is common for people to believe that, on the whole, adoptive 
families do not function well or that the majority of adopted children have behavioral problems 
(Wegar 2000). Yet, the sociological evidence on adoption actually confirms the opposite (Blake 
et al. 2014). In summary, there are good reasons not to allow the fallout that public funding for 
IVF would have for adoptive families so that other people can realize their pronatalist vision of a 
good life (i.e., a vision that necessarily includes bearing children).   
 Before concluding this section, let me be clear that the above concern about expressive 
harm applies to funding for IVF grounded in medical necessity. (By contrast, notice that the 
concerns about equality and fairness apply to any funding, regardless of what grounds it.) If the 
government could provide some subsidy to IVF patients—in the form of a tax credit, for 
example—but do so on grounds other than medical necessity, it might avoid causing expressive 
harm. Without endorsing such a subsidy, let me say two things about it: (1) it may be appropriate 
given the anguish many people admittedly feel when IVF provides their only hope of having 
biological children; and (2) it should definitely not be greater than what the government offers to 
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people who choose adoption (McLeod 2015) or engage in similarly worthy pursuits, that is, for 
reasons having to do with equality and fairness.  
The main purpose of this section has been twofold: first, to show that to deem IVF 
medically necessary, the government would have to value procreation a great deal, more than it 
values other methods of building families with children or being child-free, and second, to 
explain why, in my view, it should not value procreation this much. The main reasons I gave in 
favor of the second point had to do with equality, fairness, and (expressive) harm. I have also 
suggested that the presumed superiority of procreation over adoption may not fit with the facts 
about adoption,28 which indicate that most adoptive families function well. Let me add that I also 
doubt that such a claim coheres with my government’s values concerning families, given the 
desire it showed in convening the Expert Panel of improving both adoption and assisted 
reproductive services in Ontario.   
 
4. Conclusion 
The Report (2009) asserts that Ontario wants to be a place that values all families with 
children. Presumably, many governments like Ontario’s desire the same thing. However, such a 
desire is not compatible with them deeming IVF to be a medically necessary service. Classifying 
IVF in this way is impossible without suggesting that procreation is so important that some 
people (namely women) should be willing to sacrifice much of their time, their physical comfort, 
and possibly their emotional well-being to be able to conceive and bear children. Stating that 
such actions are necessary for many infertile people also ignores adoption as an option or, at the 
very least, implies that it should be everyone’s second choice. In addition, it suggests that 
infertile people who decide against assisted reproduction and in favor of a life without children 
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will never achieve the level of well-being possible with parenting a child. A government that 
conveys such messages to the public is friendly only to certain families with children, and at the 
expense of people who choose not to have children.  
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Notes  
1. The government decided, in the end, to fund “one IVF cycle per eligible patient per 
lifetime” though not using OHIP (Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care [2015]; see 
also Martin Regg Cohn [2015a]). My commentary on this decision appears in McLeod (2015). 
2. In the academic debate on this topic, some say that IVF is indeed medically necessary 
or fulfills a medical need (Johnston and Gusmano 2013; McMillan 2001; McMillan 2003), while 
others are committed to the opposite view (De Wispelaere and Weinstock 2014; Rulli 2014; 
Baylis 2013; Bartholet 1993; Bartholet 1995). But what is more, most bioethicists and 
philosophers have been silent on whether IVF should be deemed a medically necessary service. 
3. Assuming that to procreate is to produce genetically related children, not all IVF 
involves procreation. When people do IVF with donor gametes, they do not procreate. I focus on 
IVF that does not use donor gametes, because it is the main target of public funding campaigns 
for IVF in Canada. 
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4. Despite the role that medical necessity plays in federal legislation about health care in 
Canada, no formal definition of the term appears in federal law or policy (Charles et al. 1997). 
But we need at least a working definition to be able to decide whether IVF is medically 
necessary. I use the common sense understanding just described, which is admittedly vague 
because it includes “health,” a term whose meaning is contested. Below, however, I provide 
some insight into how to interpret this concept.   
5. I am assuming, more explicitly, that health is subjectively valuable in the sense not 
simply that we value what we judge to be healthy but that our values influence those judgments 
in the first place. By contrast, some philosophers argue that health is objectively (or inherently) 
valuable. On this view, health is valuable regardless of whether we view it that way. Although I 
find this alternative view about health compelling, my understanding of medical necessity relies 
only on the weaker view that health has subjective value. 
6. To be more exact, Boorse (1997) defined disease in his later work as a dysfunction that 
is typical not of a whole species but of a reference class, which is smaller than a species and may 
include an age group (Ereshefsky 2009, 222). Boorse recognized, for instance, that “normal 
reproductive capacity varies among different age classes of humans” (222). On his account, 
infertility is a disease only for people who are members of certain age groups. 
7. In the clinical context, infertility is given the following “time-based definition”: the 
inability to conceive after twelve months of regular unprotected sexual intercourse (Mladovsky 
and Sorenson 2010, 117). 
8. I know of no bioethicist or philosopher who defends this conclusion about medical 
necessity; however, I think discussing it is important because those who accept Boorse’s theory 
of health would be drawn to it. As I have said, this theory is prominent, especially in medicine. 
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9. One might object that nondiseased people could receive treatment on grounds other 
than medical necessity and have this treatment funded, which, in Ontario, would have to occur 
through tax credits. Whether such a system—where the type of funding and the reasons for it 
differ between different groups—would be fair, however, would depend on different factors, 
including whether it would be unduly burdensome financially for one group (i.e., the one that has 
to pay out of pocket initially for treatment). 
10. As this discussion suggests, labeling something a “disease” does not settle the 
question of whether treatment for it is medically necessary. For example, some will simply point 
to the World Health Organization’s (2016) designation of infertility as a disease to show that IVF 
is medically necessary. But such an argument will be unsuccessful because, even if WHO’s 
position were correct, IVF still might not be medically necessary. 
11. Sometimes, these disagreements focus not on biological or medical facts but on what 
has value (Ereshefsky 2009, 222). The debate over whether infertility is a disease is a case in 
point. Participants generally disagree not about the biological causes of infertility, but on how 
valuable procreation is. The point is that, to be able to explain such disagreements, one has to 
recognize the role values play in determining who is healthy or diseased. 
12. This means that even he would not accept the conception of medical necessity used in 
the above argument. He would not agree that judgments about what is medically necessary can 
be value neutral. 
13. Included in this group are people who desperately want to have children, but are not 
concerned with whether the children they have are biologically related to them. Parenthood is 
more important to these people than procreation. As a result, they may turn immediately to 
adoption, rather than try assisted reproduction, upon receiving a diagnosis of infertility. 
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14. The Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society (2014) reported that, in 2013, the live 
birth rate in Canada per fresh embryo transfer cycle was 41 percent for women under thirty-five 
years of age, 30 percent for women ages thirty-five to thirty-nine, and 14 percent for women ages 
forty and over. For frozen embryo transfer cycles, the numbers were 31 percent, 24 percent, and 
15 percent, respectively. 
15. For example, patients might get the good news one day that the physicians were able 
to extract ten eggs but then get the bad news the next day that only four of the eggs were mature 
enough to be fertilized. They then find out that three of the four fertilize, but only one of the 
resulting embryos is actually worth implanting. 
16. More specifically (and to distinguish adoptive parenting from foster parenting), one is 
able to develop a permanent relationship with a child as his or her parent. On whether the goal of 
having such a relationship is the most important aspect of procreating, we would surely balk if a 
man were to say that his main aim in procreating was to spread his seed, or a woman were to say 
that her main goal was to experience pregnancy (O’Neill 1979; Botterell and McLeod 2015). 
17. One need not assume, however, that procreation is worth this much for everyone; one 
could accept both that IVF is medically necessary and that it is reasonable for some infertile 
people to refuse it on the grounds that the trade-offs they would have to make are too high for 
them. At the same time though one would be committed to the view that these people’s lives are 
deficient, because they have not been able to procreate. 
18. I personally found adoption easier for a number of reasons, one of which is because, 
with IVF, the blood tests, ultrasounds, and hormone injections, and so on are a constant reminder 
(particularly for the woman undergoing them) that one is struggling to have a child. By contrast, 
with adoption, once the home study is in, one can become immersed in other things while 
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waiting for a referral for a child. One can focus less on becoming a mother, which is important 
when one is having difficulty doing so. 
19. My work as chair of the board for Adopt4Life (n.d.), Ontario’s Adoptive Parent 
Association, focuses on making the necessary changes to adoption systems in this province. 
20. This was the view of the majority in the audiences at two panels I organized at 
meetings of the Canadian Philosophical Association (at the University of Victoria in 2013 and at 
Brock University in 2014). The first panel concerned whether IVF should be publicly funded, 
while the second focused on Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges (Baylis and 
McLeod 2014), which covers the topic of IVF funding. 
21. I assume that concerns about equality and fairness are tightly linked in this context. 
Thus, government measures that make it financially more difficult for people to adopt children 
than to pursue IVF would result not only in inequality, but also unfairness. 
22. There is such a tax credit in the United States. See, for example Independent 
Adoption Center (n.d.).  
23. The other services include embryo freezing and frozen embryo transfer. In addition, 
the Expert Panel (2009) recommended that the government “introduce a 50% refundable tax 
credit with a ceiling of $20,000 … to help offset the costs of fertility medications” (122; 
emphasis added). By contrast, it said that the provincial adoption tax credit should change only 
so that the ceiling for allowable expenses increases to $30,000 CAD (82). The credit would still 
be nonrefundable and given at the provincial tax rate. Such a system of provincial funding for 
IVF and adoption would be grossly unfair, in my opinion, to people who adopt children.  
24. I assume here and elsewhere in this paper that private adoptions, including many 
intercountry adoptions, are worth doing. But some will object to this assumption concerning 
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intercountry adoptions. In the words of one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper, this form 
of adoption “has to be understood as part of a global economy, where the demand for children 
leads to a supply of children.” This view, which describes one pole in the highly polarized debate 
about intercountry adoption, is extreme in my opinion (as is the opposite pole, according to 
which intercountry adoption is absolutely wonderful and should be seriously expanded). I cannot 
defend my position here on intercountry adoption, but see Elizabeth Bartholet and David Smolin 
(2012) to get some sense of the debate. 
25. Jurgen De Wispelaere and Daniel Weinstock (2014) worry about this outcome when 
discussing state policies that embrace the view that one method of becoming a parent is superior 
to all others.  
26. To be clear, my point is not that anyone would intend to send these messages. We 
cannot always control what messages people receive from our actions, usually because of social 
norms that give meaning to them that may conflict with our intentions. On norms that are 
relevant to understanding the social meaning of claims that IVF is medically necessary, see the 
next paragraph in the body of this paper.  
27. A negative implication other than expressive harm might be that people see adoption 
as a less and less viable alternative to IVF, that is, if they are told that IVF is indeed medically 
necessary. They might, in fact, ignore this option altogether. 
28. I have not gone so far as to claim that this allegation of superiority is false, although I 
do believe it is. See Christine Overall (2014) and Elizabeth Brake and Joseph Millum (2012) (in 
particular, their section on the morality of procreation). 
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